Religious Nationalism in Russia: A Postmodern Identity? by Sergeev, Mikhail
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 14 | Issue 2 Article 4
4-1994
Religious Nationalism in Russia: A Postmodern
Identity?
Mikhail Sergeev
Temple University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.
Recommended Citation
Sergeev, Mikhail (1994) "Religious Nationalism in Russia: A Postmodern Identity?," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe:
Vol. 14: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol14/iss2/4
RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA: A POSTMODERN IDENTITY?
by Mikhail Sergeev
Mikhail Sergeev is a native of Russia. He studied at Moscow Institute of International 
Relations. He received his M.A. from Temple University and is currently a doctoral 
student at the same institution. This article is based on a presentation he made at the 
American Academy of Religion in 1993 in Washington, D.C., at the Eastern European 
and Former Soviet Concerns Consultation, "Nationalism and Religion."
Since the 19th century the cultural life of Russia has been shaped by two major 
ideological movements which, as a famous Russian philosopher and writer, Alexander 
Herzen, once noted, were like the two heads of one eagle. The first party, the Slavophils, 
claimed that Russia should follow its specific way based on the Orthodox Christian 
tradition while their antagonists, the Westernizers, insisted on joining the large root of the 
Western secularized civilization. The basis for this disagreement has not disappeared. In 
fact, it is still questionable whether the Communist project in Russia was part of or an 
alternative to the West?
There are two main positions regarding the succession of communism to the monarchist 
Russia. On the one hand, some historians affirm that while being an unprecedented event 
in human history, communism nevertheless continued the existing legacy of expansionist 
politics and autocratic rule in Russia. Their opponents, on the contrary, tend to idealize 
Russian history by claiming that communism came as an unexpected disaster which 
broke up the tradition. There is great distance, they argue, between the absolutism of 
Russian tsars whose reign was sanctioned by the Church and the authoritarian regime 
headed by secular dictators. However, the relationship of this new Communist Russia to 
the West remains unclear. Did Russia come through the Enlightenment or not? Can one 
speak of Russian cultural and political modernity, and if so, in what terms?
Those scholars who associate the cultural aspects of modernity with its specific political 
expressions by identifying the latter with the rise and establishment of democratic 
institutions are consequently convinced that Russia was never modernized. Russia's 
political system is indeed far from being democratic. Therefore, they point out, it is a 
backward country, but still a great power challenging the Western democracies.
In my opinion, such an extreme view while it seems attractive and can be supported by a 
commonsense argument, oversimplifies the situation. It is unable, for example, to give a 
satisfactory explanation of the fact that the ideology of communism was primarily based 
on Marxist doctrines which themselves grew out of the Enlightenment. Russia went 
through the 'semi-Enlightenment,' using the expression of another Russian thinker, 
Nicolas Berdyaev, who wrote in his book, New Middle Ages, "Russia--and here is the 
specificity of its destiny--never could have accepted as a whole the humanitarian culture 
of modern times, its formal logic and formal law, its religious neutrality, its secular 
meanness."
By virtue of its Orthodox Christian heritage Russia did not accept religious 
modernization as exemplified by Protestantism, but it did absorb the intellectual 
modernity expressed by the thinkers of the Enlightenment. When the reformation of 
religious institutions did not occur, these intellectual ideas were used differently than they 
were in the West.
It is well known that the project of the Enlightenment has been centered on the notion of 
science and the scientific worldview. Let me recall with JÃƒÂ¼rgen Habermas the words 
of Max Weber who "characterizes cultural modernity as the separation of the substantive 
reason expressed in religion and metaphysics into three autonomous spheres [which are] 
science, morality and art."
Hence, Habermas says, "the project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment consists in their efforts to develop objective science, 
universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic."
The privilege of the scientific narrative over all other narratives has led to the 
secularization of societies and to the belief in achieving the ultimate truth by scientific 
means. The Communist utopia in Russia radicalized this very enlightenment project by 
applying it to the realm of politics. In fact, if there is a group of people (a "new type 
party"), who possesses a true teaching (scientific communism) capable of leading people 
to universal happiness, what is the need for democracy? On the contrary, the execution of 
power by a majority of the people appears in this case to be less rational because the truth 
often is discovered by a genius against the rules and customs of the masses. Thus, while 
democracy might be seen as one side of modernity, totalitarianism is another, no doubt, 
much more cruel face of it.
Totalitarian reality is by no means a step back to the political modernity. Totalitarianism, 
perhaps, represents another, medieval worldview which was based on the authority of 
religion. The totalitarian mind is rather rooted in the crisis of religious consciousness and 
uncovers the depth of the struggle to recover a lost identity. The genealogy of 
totalitarianism begins with the collapse of traditional faith and goes through the 
temptations of secular nationalism. Without finding any solid ground there, it takes 
another step toward the abyss by creating an atheistic state which rejects both nationalism 
and religion.
I was born in the 1960s in the former Soviet Union which embodied such a society, and I 
belong to the third generation raised under its international and pseudo-religious dogmas. 
First and foremost, we were a 'new community of Soviet people' whose identity 
supposedly transcended national as well as religious borders. Even the memory of the 
culture was not fully available to us. The communist regime pretended to start our history 
over. As it was written in school manuals, before October, 1917, there were only wars, 
class struggles, and the suffering of the common people.
Today, following the collapse of communist ideology and the former Soviet Union, the 
Russian people are rediscovering their cultural past. The new government proclaims the 
'sacred' goals of political democracy and a free market economy. However, in the light of 
our analysis of the ways of modern Russia to think that this nation is on its way back to 
capitalism would be another oversimplification. Instead of repeating the experiences of 
capitalist countries, Russia will most likely find her own path to a post-industrial stage of 
civilization. In other words, Russia is in search of a post-modern identity which would 
probably be as specific as Russian modern history is.
Generally speaking, post-modernism can be characterized as an ideology of a post-
industrial community, "often also designated a consumer society, media society, 
information society, electronic society or high tech, and the like."3 This transition from 
the industrial to the post-industrial era is marked by the growing importance of 
information and the new technologies which have to do with its transmission. Knowledge 
becomes one of the products of consumption; it is produced in order to be sold. This 
mercantilization of knowledge brings about a whole new technology with a new world 
space of multinational capital which is accompanied by ideological multi-polarity and the 
denial of meta-narrative ways of social legitimation. As one of the champions of the post-
modern condition, Jean-Francois Lyotard, puts it, "the Grand Narrative has lost its 
credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a 
speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation." Lyotard himself is advocating this 
'delegitimation' through a variety of equally acceptable language games. He argues that 
"the social subject itself seems to dissolve in this dissemination of language games . . . 
nobody speaks all of those languages, they have no universal metalanguage."
The concept of science as one of these languages is being reexamined by postmodern 
thinkers as radically as the concept of history is. The ultimate authority of science during 
the Enlightenment age is being replaced by the relative importance of scientific discourse 
seen as only one of the domains of knowledge with its special rules and prescriptions. 
Finally, having rejected all possible meta-narratives, including political ones, 
postmodernism has found itself without defending either political radicalism nor 
extremism. Most postmodernist thinkers even when coming from a Marxian tradition 
recognize political loyalty, stress pluralism, and do not appeal to revolutionary changes.
However, in spite of such a very liberational spirit, the challenge of all privileges and 
absolute authorities has, like everything in our world, its negative side. By opposing 
political meta-narratives, it deconstructs the idea of democracy as a supreme ideal for the 
nations. The post-modern framework of equal language games also leaves room for 
religion as at least one of those possible games.
At the same time the post-modern movement does not break with its father, modernity, in 
a crucial issue of traditional faith. On the contrary, it reinforces the negation of 
the'medieval' religious vision the same way it denies other meta-narratives. In these 
circumstances the authority of religion becomes easily combined with nationalism and 
acquires a more fundamentalist character.
That is how contemporary 'neo-conservative' post-modernism might well turn into 
religious nationalism just as liberal modernism has been paralleled by atheistic 
totalitarian states in its fascist and communist forms. It is happening already in many 
parts of Eastern Europe, and the extreme danger of this process is being demonstrated by 
the war in Bosnia, a war which up until now no one has been able to stop. Unfortunately, 
this scenario also perfectly fits the former Soviet republics and, especially, Russia with its 
more than seventy years of Soviet political and cultural heritage.
The rediscovery of the pre-revolutionary past which was brutally repressed during the 
'cosmopolitan' Soviet era spontaneously disposes Russians to emphasize their national 
feelings and belonging. Simultaneously, an over-reaction to the more than seventy years 
of persecution of religion in Russia might naturally lead to an Orthodox fundamentalism. 
If the Russian successor-state of the USSR under these circumstances will continue the 
totalitarian policy, it will likely surpass its predecessor in aggressiveness and will to 
destruction. The victory of the ultra-nationalist party led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the 
recent elections may well be just the first manifestation of such a post-modern Russia.
 
